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Structural and Stabilization Aspects of Fiscal and Financial Policy
in the Dependent Economy
Part I
Abstract
The paper considers the response of a small, open dependent economy
to a variety of fiscal and financial shocks as well as the influence of
alternative budget balancing rules on the response of the system to such
external shocks as a change in the world interest rate.
The approach allows for both uncertain individual lifetimes and
population growth, using a slightly generalized version of the Yaari-Blanchard
model of consumer behavior. Debt neutrality does not prevail unless the sum
of the population growth rate and the individual's probability of death equals
zero. The government spends on traded and non-traded goods and raises tax
revenue both through a lump sum tax and through a distortionary tax on the
production of traded goods.
Even though the tax on the production of traded goods is the only
conventional distortion in the model.; changes in this tax rate will have first
order real income effects even when the distortion is evaluated at a zero tax
rate, as long as the individual's subjective pure rate of time preference
differs from the interest rate. This can occur even in well-behaved steady
states of the Yaari-Blanchard model, as long as the population growth rate
plus the probability of death differ from zero. This "intrinsic" distortion
effectively causes second-best arguments to apply even when there is only one
conventional distortion.
Even in the absence of government budget deficits, fiscal choices
relating to the composition of public spending and the structure of taxation
have important short-term-and long-term consequences for the real exchange
rate, the sectoral allocation of production, the level and composition of
private consumption, the current account (in the short run) and the nation's
stock of claims on the rest of the world in the long run.

I would like to thank Jonathan Eaton for many helpful discussions,
especially in connection with the "first-order" real income effects of changes
in a distortionary tax rate, when evaluated at a zero level of the distortion,
in the Yaari-Blanchard model of consumption.
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Introduction
This 1s the first of a series of three papers dealing with the

macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy 1n an open economy, a very broad
subject area.

It covers the implications of alternative public spending,

revenue ra1s1ng and financing actions (or of alternative public spending,
revenue ra1s1ng and financing rules) for a wide range of endogenous
macroeconomic variables, both prices and quantities.

Among the most important

prices are nominal and real interest rates and the cost of capital, the
nominal and real exchange rate, the nominal and real wage rate, the terms of
trade and the general price level.

The most important quantities are the

level of domestic output and employment and their composition in terms of
traded and nontraded goods sectors, the domestic capital stock and the
domestic rate of capital accumulation, the financial assets and liabilities of
the private and government sectors and their financial deficits or
surpluses.

The responses of these prices and quantities can be studied 1n the

short run (i.e. at a point in time), in the timeless long run of the
stationary or steady state and, most interestingly, along a "real-time"
dynamic adjustment path.
There are many taxonomies for classifying and subdividing this vast
subject.

The one adopted in these papers involves a two way "real" vs.

"monetary" and "balanced-budget" vs. "unbalanced budget" classification.

Real

models, considered in the first two papers, do not include a monetary
sector.

Private agents do not hold money and seigniorage or the inflation tax

is not a source of government revenue.

Governments can borrow, by issuing

interest-bearing "real" debt, and financial crowding out can occur, in the
short-run and/or the long run.· Money is added to the private sector's
portfolio of financial assets and money creation to the public sector's
sources of revenue in the third paper.
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The "balanced" vs. "unbalanced" budget dichotomy emphasizes that
there are two kinds of macroeconomic effects associated with fiscal policy,
even in "real" models where money financing is not an option.

The first kind

operates through the public sector debt dynamics associated with unbalanced
public sector budgets, i.e. with public sectors financial deficits or
surpluses.

The presence of these effects is contingent on the absence of

"debt neutrality".

The second kind, the balanced budget effects, are the

consequences of variations in the volume and composition of public spending
and in the level and structure of taxation for real and nominal variables that
occur even when the budget is balanced continuously.
contingent on the absence of debt neutrality.

These effects are not

They operate through "direct

crowding out" (Suiter [1977]), i.e. through the direct complementarity or
substitutability of public consumption or investment and private consumption
or investment, through the direct (selective or across-the-board) preemption
of real resources by government absorption and through the allocative or
incentive effects of changes 1n non-lump sum taxes, transfers, or subsidies.
Recently, the focus of much macroeconomic analysis has been on public
sector debt and deficits and their consequences, through "indirect financial
crowding out," for private saving, capital formation and the current account
of the balance of payments.
issues.

The second and third papers address some of these

The present paper, however, focuses on the important effects of

balanced budget fiscal policy on the real exchange rate, the sectoral
allocation of productive resources between traded and non-traded goods,
private consumption and the nation's net external asset position.

It

considers the impact, steady state and transitional effects of balanced-budget
fiscal policy in a simple open economy macroeconomic model, which is set out
1n Section 2.

The "balanced budget" 1n this paper 1s, strictly speaking, a
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"real growth corrected" balanced budget.

In such an equilibrium the deficit,

as a fraction of full employment GDP, equals nS, where n is the growth rate of
full employment real output and Sis the public debt outstanding as a fraction
of capacity GDP.
time.

Such a policy keeps the burden of the debt, S, constant over

When there 1s no real growth (n=O) the growth-corrected balanced budget

and the conventional balanced budget coincide for the model of papers 1 and
2.

For the monetary model in paper 3 we define a "real growth, inflation and

exchange rate appreciation-corrected balanced budget."

This corresponds to a

conventionally measured budget deficit (as a fraction of GDP) equal to
nS + p (1 - k ) S - ek + (n + p) µ.
1
2

Here n is as before the growth rate of

capacity real output, Sis the ratio of all government interest-bearing public
debt to capacity GDP, k 1 is the share of the public debt that is index-linked,
k 2 is the share of the public debt that is denominated 1n foreign currency,µ
1s the monetary base-capacity GDP ratio, pis the rate of inflation and e is
the proportional rate of exchange rate depreciation.

A deficit or surplus of

this magnitude is consistent with maintaining a constant overall debt burden
and with constant ratios to capacity GDP of each of the interest-bearing and
monetary liabilities of the authorities.
The model developed in Section 2 of this paper bundles familiar
ingredients in a somewhat novel fashion.

Private consumption behavior is

modeled according to the uncertain lifetimes version of the overlapping
generations model due to Yaari (1965) and first applied to the analysis of
macroeconomic issues by Blanchard (1984, 1985).

Uncertain lifetimes result 1n

effective private sector subjective discount rates that exceed the pure rate
of time preference and in effective private sector market discount rates that
exceed the government's interest rate.

This causes absence of debt-neutrality

and creates a non-trivial role for financial policy, i.e. for variations in
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the taxation-borrow ing mix for a given path of real public spending on current
goods and services (or "exhaustive" spending), even when taxes are lump-sum.
Even without uncertain lifetimes, population growth alone can, as
shown by Weil (1985), cause absence of debt neutrality.

Even infinite-lived

consumers cannot command the resources of those yet to be born, while the
authorities can use them as a tax base.

A growing population therefore

extends the public sectors's opportunity set beyond that available to the
private agents currently alive.

(See also Suiter [1986b]).

The production side of the model is the "dependent economy model" of
Wilson (1931), Swan (1960) and Salter (1959) in the modern version due to
Dornbusch (1974, 1980, Ch. 6, PP• 93-116).
The country is assumed to be a price taker in the world markets for
all tradeables, importables and exportables alike.
therefore exogenous.
ignored.

The terms of trade are

For the issues addressed in these papers they can be

They are aggregated into a composite commodity, traded goods.

Non

traded goods are also produced and consumed (by the private and the public
sector).

The real exchange rate; or the relative price of traded to non

traded goods, is the crucial atemporal or static relative price in this
model.

Wage and price flexiblity and full employment of resources are assumed

to hold throughout.
Some of the key conclusions are the following.

Balanced budget

fiscal policy actions will in general have short-run and long-run effects on
the real exchange rate and real private absorption.

They will also tend to

have transitory effects on the current account and permanent effects on the
nation's net foreign asset position.

"Balanced-budg et multipliers" can be

negative in the short run and in the long run when the increase in public
spending is financed by higher distortionary tax rates.

An increase in the

- s-
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distortionary tax rate on the production of tradeables may have such strong
negative income effects, that the demand for nontraded goods declines
sufficiently to lower the producer's relative price of nontraded goods.

In

that extreme case nontradeables production could contract and tradeables
production expand in spite of the increase in the tax rate on traded goods
production.

This can happen even when the initial ~evel of the distortion 1s

zero, if the (exogenous) real interest rate exceeds ~he (exogenous) rate of
time-preference, something that is consistent with equilibrium given Yaari
Blanchard preferences.

2.

The Model
a.

Private Consumption

Household consumption behavior is determined by the intertemporal
optimization model of Yaari and Blanchard (Yaari [1965], Blanchard [1984,
1985]).

Each individual has a constant (age-and ti~e-independent)

instantaneous probability of death X

~

O.

Another interpretation of Xis the

probability of dynastic extinction (through childlessness) in a model in which
an intergenerational gift or bequest motive is permitted.

The details of the

derivation of the individual and aggregate consumption rules are given 1n
Appendix 1.

The important consequences• of introducing uncertain lifetimes are

(1) that the effective instantaneous subjective discount rate of households is

o+

X, where

o

is the instantaneous pure rate of subjective time preference

(o > 0) and (2) that the effective market discount rate is r + X where r is

the instantaneous real interest rate.

Population growth in addition means

that the public sector's tax base grows at a rate n, unlike the resource base
available to those private agents currently alive (even if X=O).
[1985] and Suiter [1986b]).

(See Weil
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An individual household discounts its uncertain future after-tax non
interest income using a discount rater+ A, while the government discounts
its certain and growing (at a rate n) aggregate future tax revenue using a
discount rater.

Another way of looking at this is that aggregate private

consumption and saving behavior are functions of the human capital of those
households that are currently alive.

The government knows it will be able.to

tax in the future both those households alive today and those yet to be born
that survive into the future.

Its tax revenues are therefore not subject to

the uncertainty attached to an individual household's future after-tax labor
income stream, and unlike the individual's, grow at a rate n.
With private discount rates exceeding public sector discount rates as
long as A+ n > O, there will be no debt neutrality:

for a given program of

government spending on real goods and services (or exhaustive spending), the
substitution of public borrowing for current taxation will affect private
consumption and aggregate private plus public saving, even if the taxes are
lump-sum.

The debt neutrality case 1s the special case of this model

where A= n = 0 and households live forever.
Aggregate household behavior is characterized 1n equations (1)
through (5).

q denotes per capita private consumption expenditure, measured

in terms of traded goods.

w is per-capita non-human or financial household

wealth, h per capita human capital, rr per capita non-interest income and, per
capita taxes net of transers.

w, h, rr and, are measured in terms of traded

goods. xT 1s per capita household consumption of traded goods, xN per capita
household consumption of non-traded goods and p the relative price of non
traded goods, 1.e. the reciprocal of the real exchange rate.

r 1s the

instantaneous real interest rate measured in terms of traded goods
and n

~

0 the constant instantaneous population growth rate.

SUD/wb/08-22-86
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(1)

q = (o + A) (w + h)

o > O, A~ 0

(2)

w = (r - n) w + n - , - q

r >

(3)

h(t) =

o;

n

~

0

-fv (r(u) + A) du
t
[n(v) - ,(v)] dv
t
f e
oo

1/

or
(3')

h = (r + A) h - (n - ,)

(4)

q

(Sa)

XT

= n(p)q

(Sb)

XN

= (1

= xT

+ pxN

p

.~

0 5 n 5 l; n 5

n<P>>

o;

1 - n + pn' > 0

q

Per capita consumption, q, is a constant, o + A times comprehensive
(human plus non-human) per capita wealth.

Per capita consumption of the

individual commodities, xT and xN is determined recursively, given q, by
equations (Sa, b).

As shown in Appendix 1, equations (1) and (Sa, b) result

when the individual's utility functional is time-additive with a constant
risk-adjusted subjective instantaneous discount rate o + A, and instantaneous
utility a logarithmic function of a linear homogenous function of the
instantaneous consumption vector (xT, xN).
With homothetic preferences over instantaneous consumption, it is
easily checked that, given q, an increase in the relative price of non-traded
goods can either raise or lower consumption of traded goods (n'

~

5

must lower the consumption of non-traded goods (1 - n + pn' > 0).

0) while it
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In Figure 1, the budget constraint qE represents a higher value of p
than qF.

With homethetic preferences, indifference curves have a common slope

along any ray through the origin such as OA.

With strictly convex

indifference curves such as KK and K'K', the consumer's equilibrium moves from
B

to D when p increases.

xN falls while xT either increases or decreases.

In

the Cobb-Douglas case (Sa', b') xT remains unchanged.

(Sa')

0

::5

a ::5 1

= (1 - a) q
p

(Sb I)

For the CES family, given in (Sa", b") xT increases when the
elasticity of substitution (a= - 1-). is greater than 1 and falls when it is
1-p
less than 1.
_P_

(Sa")

(Sb")

XT

XN

p
p-1 -1
p
]
q

=

p-1
[1 + ( ~ )
1-a

=

1
1
_P_
( ( ~ ) p)p-1- [ 1 + <~l-1 p p-1 ] -1 q
1-a
1-a

0 ::5 a

::5

1; p < 1

In the extreme case of Leontief indifference curves (shown as LL and
L'L' in Figure 1) with a zero elasticity of substitution, consumption of both
goods contracts along the ray OA from B to C asp increases.
Note that the consumption function (1) can, using (2) and (3') be
rewritten as:

(l')

q = (r -

or

(o + n)) q - A (o + A) w + n (o + A) h

""

"'

9

Figure 1

A

q

0
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o) q -

(\ + n) (o + \) w

Even though public sector debt and deficits matter 1n the Yaari
Blanchard model with\> O, financial markets are "perfect" 1n the sense that
households can borrow against the security of their expected future after-tax
labor income, i.e. that (discounted) future expected disposable labor income
is as good a source of purchasing power as current disposable income.
could weaken this e.g. by assuming that a fraction

y

One

of households in each

vintage is constrained to spend its current disposable income.

The remaining

fraction, 1 - y, would follow the Yaari-Blanchard paradigm and would determine
its consumption behavior subject only to its intertemporal present value
budget constraint.

Under this specification of aggregate consumption

behavior, equation (1) would be replaced by (l"'), while equations (2), (3),
(4), and (Sa,b) remain the same.

q = (o + \) (w + (1 - y) h) + y (n - ,)

(1 "')

y

~

0

In the interest of simplicity the present paper only consider the
case where y = 0.

It is easily checked that, if r = o, the steady state

properties (but not the dynamics) of the model are independent of y.
Equation (2) defines the rate of change of non-human wealth per
capita as saving per capita (rw + n -

T -

q) minus the amount of asset

accumulation required to off set the effects of population growth (nw) •·

For

each individual born at times, human wealth h(s,t) evolves according
d

-

-

-

-

to dt h(s,t) = (r + \) h (s, t) - (n (s, t) - ,(s,t)), '±_/ i.e. it equals the
present value of future disposable non-interest income, using the risk
adjusted discount rater+\:
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-fv (r{u) + l) du
h (s, t) =

It

oo

e

t

(~" ( s, v ) -

T

( s, v ) dv

Aggregate human wealth H can be shown to evolve according to
H(t) = (r +A+ n) H - IT - T, where IT and Tare aggregate non-interest income
and taxes respectively.

Per capita human wealth therefore again evolves

according to (3').

Production
The production of traded and nontraded goods 1s modeled through the
device of the representative competitive multiproduct firm which maximizes at
each instant the value of its production of traded and nontraded goods subject
to the technological production possibility frontier i sketched in Figure 2.
Yr and YN are the per capita production of traded and nontraded goods,
respectively.

max

The firm's problem is

1r

= (1 - e) yT + pyN

e

< 1

Yr,YN
i

e

I

< Q; 1 11 < Q

is the rate of taxation on the production of traded goods.

The world price

of traded goods, which is also the price faced by consumers, is unity.
producer's price 1s 1 -

The

e.

The first-order condition for an interior optimum 1s ~ = -i'(yN).
This permits us to write the per capita supplies of traded and nontraded goods
as functions of the producer's-relative price of traded goods,~, and to
write per capita net domestic product as a function of p and of

e.

12

Figure 2

SUD/wb/08-22-86

- 13 -

= £"

y'

=?

T

N

(8c)

1T

=

1T

-2,

y'

-1

I

5 0

2: 0

(p, 8)

The Government
The government spends on traded goods, gT, and on non-traded goods,
gN.

It raises revenue by taxing households,, and by taxing production in the

traded goods sector, 8yT.

It finances any deficit or surplus by issuing or

retiring interest-bearing debt b denominated in terms of traded goods.
gN,, and bare all per capita quantities.

gT''

From the government's budget

identity we therefore obtain:

In principle gT,
rate.

gN

and, could all be functions of the real exchange

Let total per capita public spending measured in terms of traded goods

be denoted g, 1.e.

(lOa)

I'll assume that g is independent of p and that spending on the individual
commodities is, by analogy with private sector behavior, given by:

(lOb)

0 5 e 5 l; e
p
€

a

> 0

5
2:

O; 1 - e + pe
p

2:

0
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(loc)

o 1s a shift parameter, with an increase 1n o signifying a shift towards
public spending on traded goods, given p and g.

Taxes on households,

(measured in traded goods) are assumed to be independent of p, and so is 9.
The government's intertemporal present value budget constraint or
solvency constraint is obtained by integrating (9) forward in time and
imposing the "no-Ponzi game" transversality condition
2,

-J[r(u)-n]du
lim b(!)e t

= O.

I+m

This condition makes sense if, on average, the future instantaneous real
interest rate is expected to exceed the future growth rate of the real tax
base (r>n).

The present value government budget constraint is given in (lla

and b).

s
00

(lla)

s

-J(r[u])-n)du

fg(s)e t

(D

ds = J(,(s)+ayT(~))e t

t

or
00

(llb)

ds - b(t)

t
s

-Jr(u)du

JG(s)e t
t

-f( r( u)-n )du

s
00

-Jr(u)du

ds = J(T(s)+aYT(s))e t

ds - B(t)

t

where

Equation (llb) states that the present value of future planned government
revenue should equal the present value of future planned public spending plus
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the outstanding stock of public debt.

Equation (lla) makes the equivalent

statement using per capita quantities and real growth rate adjusted discount
rates.
The government's (per capita) revenue R from the tax on the
production of tradeables (or tpt) is given by
(12)

(-L)
T 1-9

R = Sy

.

An increase in 9 increases revenue proportionally at any given level of

tradeables production.

Given p, it will increase~, the producer's relative

price of non-traded goods.

The volume of tradeables production declines,

i.e., the tax base is narrowed.

Total revenue will go up or down depending on

whether$, the (absolute value of the) elasticity of Yr with respect t o ~ is
less than or greater than -1-9
-, i.e.,
9

(14)

We shall see that, in the short run and in the long run, an increase
in 9 lowers p, the consumer's relative price of non-traded goods.

To evaluate

the general equilibrium implications of an increase in 9 for R we must allow
for any endogenous response of p to the change in

(15)

where

a,

i.e.

as

lE.
will in general be different in the short run and in the long run.
ae
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In many cases, the decline in pas 9 increases is not enough to
reverse the a priori plausible result that a higher value of 9 will be
associated with a higher value of p/(1-9), i.e., with a lower producer's price
for traded goods.

It is therefore certainly possible that there is a "Laffer

curve" for the traded goods production tax.

There is a common presumption

that~ will be higher (in absolute value) for higher values of 9 (and
of p/(1-9).

In that case, a reduction in 9 from a very high level may well

increase the revenue from the tpt.

The rest of the world
The rest of the world provides the domestic economy with perfectly
elastic excess demand schedules for traded goods and for financial capital.
The instantaneous interest rate in terms of traded goods, r, is exogenous.
Three equivalent ways of writing the equation of motion for the
nation's per capita stock of external assets f
b,c).

= w-b,

are given below in (16a,

The first is based on the identity that equates the current account

surplus with net exports of traded goods plus net property income from
abroad.

The second is based on the current account surplus as the sum of the

financial surpluses of the private sector (w+nw) and the public sector
(-6-nb)

The last one represents the current account surplus as the excess of

national income over domestic absorption.

(16a)

.
(16b)

(16c)

. .
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Equilibrium in the market for non-traded goods
Wage and price flexibility ensure that the non-traded goods market
clears at each instant, 1.e.,

(17)

or

(17 I)

Equation (17 1 ) permits us to solve for the momentary equilibrium
value of pas a function of q, g,

(18a)

p = p(q; g,

a,

a

and cr

cr)

(18b)

(18c)

= -Qy' __
p__
8
N (l-a)2

(18d)

p

(18e)

p = -Q--cr < 0
a
p

Qy'
= __
T - _p_ <_ Pa <_ 0

1-8

1-8

"

gE

(18f)

Unless all spending (at the margin) 1s on traded goods (n=l or E=l)
higher private or public spending raises p.

A higher tax rate on the

SUD/wb/08-22-86
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production of traded goods, given q, g and cr, shifts resources towards the
production of non-traded goods and lowers the consumer's relative price of
nontradeables.

The effect of an increase in eon the producer's relative

price of nontraded goods~ given q, g andµ is given by
y'

=

(18g)

p

(l-e)2

(1- N n)
1-e

Thus, even though the consumer's relative price of traded goods
declines as e increases, the producer's relative price rises.

The result is

an expansion both of the demand for and the supply of non-traded goods and a
contraction in the traded goods sector.

Only when there is no scope for

reallocating production from the traded to the non-traded goods sector
(y'
N

=0

or 111

=-

00 )

will p/(1-e) increase by the full amount of the increase

in e, with p constant.

When production can be reallocated along a straight-

line production possibility frontier (y~ =
change in p(l-e) when e changes.

00

or f" = 0) there will be no

A switch towards public spending on traded

goods (an increase in cr, given g) lowers p.
When balanced budget policies are considered, it is only legitimate
to treat, g, e and cr as exogenous if the lump sum tax, is permitted to adjust
passively to ensure budget balance.

When unbalanced budget policies are

considered, , can be treated as exogenous, together with g,
taking up the slack.

e and cr, with b

Ultimately, however, the requirement of government

solvency, summarized in the present value budget constraint (lla orb), will
put an upper bound on band thereby constrains the paths taken by g, e, cr
and, over time.

With unbalanced budget policies (at any rate during the

transition to steady state) steady state government debt, b, becomes an
endogenous variable.

It is easily seen that any steady-state equilibrium that

SUD/wb/08-22-86
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satisfies (lla, b) has a real growth corrected balanced budget.

With

unbalanced budget policies outside the steady state, four out of the five
long-run fiscal parameters g, 6, a, , and b can be chosen independently.
This paper will focus on policies that maintain real growth corrected
budget balance continuously, i.e., bis treated as constant throughout.
Before turning to this in section (4), it is instructive to consider briefly
the intertemporal inconsistency of unbalanced budget models that treat all
four of the fiscal parameters g, 6, a and, as exogenous.

3.

Private sector equilibrium and public sector insolvency:

a false paradox

For convenience the model is reproduced below:

(19a)

(19b)

w = (r-n)w + n(p,6)-,-q

(19c)

YN ( 1-6

(19d)

gT

= e:(p,a)g

(19e)

gN

=

(19£)

b

(19g)

f = (r-n)f + n(p,6) + 6yT(~) - (q+g).

~ ) = (1-n(p))

p

q

+ g

(1-e:(p, a )}g
p

= (r-n)b

+ g

T

r>n~O ; 6 < 1

1-n+pn'>O

N

O~e~l ; 1-e+pe >O· e >O
p ' a

+ pg

N

- 6y (~) - ,
T 1-6
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The behavior of the private sector 1s captured entirely by equations
(19a, b, c, d and e).

Specifically, the level or rate of change of the public

debt and the level or rate of change of the nation's net claims on the rest of
the world do not influence private sector behavior, unless they affect the
fiscal parameters g, o, 9 and, (or gT' gN, 9 and,)
interest r.

or the world rate of

Ignoring this possibility for the time being, we solve for pas a

function of q, g 9 and cr as in (18a to f), substitute this into the four
equations of motion and obtain the following linear approximation of the
economy at a steady state equilibrium.

q

(20)

I
I
r-n
- - - - - -I

r-o

.
w

=

-( Hn)( o+A)

y p -1
_N_q_

9
I
- 1-9 YT Pq

6

.

f

(yN

+ 1~9 y±)pq-l

0

0

q-q

0

0

w-w

0

r-n

0

b-b

0

0

r-n

f-f

0

0

0

YNPg

-1

yNp9-yT

-

0

q

g-g

+

a
I
1 - - YrPg
1-9

-1

YNPcr

-[yT(l 1~9~) l~aY±Pal

-9 I
1-aYTPcr

w

b

,-,
9-8
cr-cr

(yN+l~ay~)pg-l

0

( J _ ')

J_

,_L

YN 1-aYT Pa 1-aYTl-8

( YN J1-9
_ YT') pa

f

r-r

the q,w subsystem in (20) characterizing private sector behavior is
self-contained.

band fare determined recursively, given q, wand the values
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assumed by the exogenous variable.

The q, w subsystem will be a saddlepoint

locally if~, the determinant of the 2x2 submatrix of the state matrix is
negative, i.e., if

When there is no non-traded goods sector, the ·second term on the
r.h.s. of (21) equals zero.

If in addition n=O, then (21) becomes the

saddlepoint equilibrium condition (r+o)(r-(o+\)) < 0 found in Blanchard [1984,
1985] and Buiter [1986a].

In the model of (21), -\ < r < o+n+\ is necessary

but no longer sufficient for saddlepoint stability.

Provided (21) holds, the

q,w subsystem has one stable (negative) and one unstable (positive)
eigenvalue.

With w a predetermined and q a non-predetermined state variable,

there will exist a unique continuously convergent solution for q and w.
In q-w space the q=O locus has slope*

(\+n)(o+A)
~
an d th e
r-u

q=O
r-n
• Throughout the paper, I assumer> n
dw w=O
1-yNpq
The latter condition means that an increase in consumption,

w=O locus has slope
and 1-yNpq>O.

=

~

=

part of which falls on non-traded goods, will not raise the relative price of
non-traded goods by so much that the value, in terms of tradeables, of non
traded goods production rises by more than the increase in consumption.

This

still leaves us with 4 qualitatiavely distinct phase diagram specifications in
q-w space, as shown in Figure 3.
Figures (JI, II and III) have the desired saddlepoint configuration.
The unique continuously convergent path for constant values of the exogenous
variables is the upward-sloping SS line along which low but rising consumption
is associated with positive saving and rising w, and high but falling
consumption is associated with dissaving and declining w.

Saddlepoint

22

Figure 3

9

s

w

.

w :o
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configurations obtain always when r=o or r<o.

They may obtain for r>o, but if

r is too far above o, the equilibrium becomes completely unstable.

We only

consider saddlepoint equilibria in what follows.
The two remaining eigenvalues of the complete system 1n (20), which
govern the public debt and net foreign assets dynamics, both equal r-n.

Since

we assume r>n, band f will diverge explosively even as q and w settle down
into stationary equilibrium.

The intrinsic dynamics of interest-bearing debt

feeds on itself 1n an explosive manner.
A government whose debt grows indefinitely at a rate faster than its
capacity to service that debt violates the solvency constraint given in
(lla,b).

An explosive net creditor position of the government (given w)

violates the solvency constraint of the rest of the world.

In either case,

the assumption that the real interest rate is exogenous becomes untenable.

In

addition, credit rationing would emerge to constrain the behavior of b
and f.

The model would break down.
Stability of the public debt process requires that, if b>O,

ultimately primary (i.e., non-interest) government surpluses are run to
service the debt.

The need to run these surpluses will sooner or later affect

the behavior of q and w through changes in g, ,, 6 or cr.

Only 1n one special

case can the dynamic properties of the present q,w subsystem be consistent
with public sector solvency.

This is the case when public spending on traded

goods, gT is adjusted, either continuously or eventually, to ensure continuous
or ultimate real growth corrected budget balance, while public spending on
non-traded goods is kept constant.

In terms of our notation, this amounts to

manipulating g _ gT+pgN to maintain budget balance and simultaneously
varying e (the share of traded goods in public spending) to ensure
that dgN = O.

With this restriction, the long-run steady state equilibrium
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of the private sector 1s given by:

(22a)

q = (o+A)(w+h)

(22b)

q = (r-n)w + n(p,9)-,

(22c)

p

= p(q;
Pq

gN'

a)

o;
= o(l-n)>
p

Pg

N

= -Qp

. P9 = -oy'
'

N

p

(l-a>2

< 0

I

YT
-1
[- - + q(l-n+pn')]
p

(22d)

Q

=

(22e)

h

= (n(p,9)-,)(r+A) -1

Substituting (22c,d) into (22a,b) we can solve for long-run q and w
as functions of gN'

a, ,

and r.

gT will not affect q,w,p or h in the short

run or 1n the long run, as long as government solvency is assured, but its
behaviour will affect the paths of band f.
The long long-run multipliers are:

(23a)

(23b)

(23c)

> 0
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(23d)

(23e)

aw

a.

-

- p

(23£)

(23g)

(23h)

aw
ae

(23i)

(23j)

~

(23k)

ar

(231)

dr

aw

= -

q

a
a.

~
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(23m)

Note that pq 1n (22c) equals pq 1n (18b).

(23n)

a(p(l-9)- 1 )
aa

Finally with i-€+p€

p

= 0

=

(p+(l-9)p )(r+X)(r-(o+n+X)) + ~p (X+n)(o+X)
9
p~

gT

When evaluating these long-run multipliers, an interesting benchmark
is the case when r=o.

When X=O, i.e., with infinite-lived consumers, well

behaved stationary equilibria (with positive but finite per capita private
consumption) exist only when

r=o.

Considering this case permits us to

evaluate the economic effects of instability or finite horizons.
Long-run private consumption,measured in traded goods increases when
public spending on non-traded goods increases and long-run budget balance is
maintained by reducing public spending on traded goods.

The reason is that p

increases (the real exchange rate appreciates) and with it real disposable
income and human capital measured 1n traded goods.

Financial private wealth w

increases if r>o, decreases if o>r.
Increased lump-sum taxes, (matched by increased gT to preserve long
run budget balance) reduce private consumption and raise financial wealth if
o>r, lower it if o < r.

This will occur even if there is no effect on the

relative price of non-traded goods, as in that case
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(n+\)(o+\)
= (r+\)(r-(o+n+\)) <

o.

Unless pq equals zero, the reduction in consumption, a fraction 1-n which
falls on non-traded goods, will lower p.
An increase in

a,

the tax rate on the production. of traded goods

directly lowers the after-tax income received by the factors of production
(w

9

= -yT < 0).

By lowering the consumer's price of non-traded

'
goods (p <0) it also reduces the value in terms of traded goods of any given
9
amount of domestic production of non-traded goods, and consumption falls.
Financial wealth rises if o>r, falls if o<r.

It doesn't matter whether tpt

revenue increases or declines, since gT is used to balance the long-run
budget.

The consumer's price of non-traded goods falls.

producer's price,~ as

a

What happens to the

increases?

In (18g) we calculated that, given q, the decline in pas
increases 1s not enough to cause~ to decline.
long run as

a

q, however, declines 1n the

is raised and this further depresses p.

~

checked that with A= O, ~ rises when
could be reversed.

a

a

From (23m) it can be

increases, but that with\> O, this

Strong negative income effects from the increase in

necessary to obtain this paradoxical result.

The increase in

a

a

are

would, across

steady states, be associated with an increase, not a decline in the volume of
tradable production and with a corresponding reduction in the volume of
nontradable production.

The demand for nontradables, however, declines (at a

given p) even more than the production of nontradables, necessitating the
equilibrium decline in p.

We return to this issue in Section 4.

A sufficient condition for an increase in the interest rate to be

associated with an increase in long-run consumption is for w to be non-
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negative.

(24)

- 28 -

Equating (22a) and (22b) we see that

(o-r)
w = -,--....,......,,---,-----,--,( r+ X) ( r- ( o+X+n))

Therefore we will be positive (negative) if r>o (o>r).
the same direction as q when r increases.

p moves in

If r>o, an increase in r will raise

As was pointed out during the discussion of the
model's stability properties, this (and similar conditions under the different
balanced budget regimes), amounts to assuming that a higher value of
consumption does not, by raising p, increase income by more than the increase
in consumption.
For all shocks other than changes in the interest rate, the r=o
special case greatly simplifies the dynamic analysis when the shocks are
unanticipated, immediate and permanent (i.e., random walk shocks).
case doesn't change in response to changes in gN, , or

a,

win that

and the

instantaneous response of q is also the long-run steady state response.

Since

w doesn't vary, the current account surplus equals the public sector
surplus.

For anticipated future shocks in gN, , or 8 and for transitory

shocks, there will be transitional private financial wealth dynamics.
From an initial position with r = o, consider the case of an
unanticipated, immediate increase in the world rate of interest which is
perceived as permanent.

For concreteness assume that the government adjusts

qT not only in the long-run but at each instant to maintain budget balance.
In Figure 4 an unanticipated permanent increase in r causes an
immediate drop in private consumption from E , the initial long-run
1

29

Figure 4:
The Effects of an Increase in r when gT Adjusts to Ensure Government Solvency

.

.
•·
.
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0
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equilibrium, to E12 , the point vertically below E on the saddle path through
1
the new long-run equilibrium.

From (23 j, k) we know that the long-run effect

of this shock is higher values of q and r.

The impact effect of a higher

world rate of interest is therefore in the opposite direction from the long
run effect.

After the initial jump down to E , consumption rises steadily
12

from E12 to E2 along

s 1s 2 • Private savings rates, however are positive

throughout the adjustment process and financial wealth accumulates.
The unexpected news, at t 0 , of a permanent future increase in rat
t > t causes a smaller initial drop in q (to E 1 say), followed by a further
1
12
0
decline in q between t 0 and t 1 when the system moves along that divergent
trajectory (drawn with reference to E ) that will place it on
1

s 2 s 2 at t 1 •

After t 1 consumption rises smoothly from E " to E •
2
12
An unanticipated increase in rat t

0 which is expected to be reversed

at t > t is followed by an immediate drop in consumption, to E 111 say.
12
1
0
Saving becomes positive and wealth accummulates until
consumption rises.

ti< t , while
1

Beyond E12 1111 , and between ti and t , consumption continues
1

to rise but dissaving takes place.

At t 1 , when the interest rate comes down

again, consumption and financial wealth are above their initial equilibrium
values at E1 •

Both q and w then decline gradually back to their initial

equilibrium levels.
Assuming continuous budget balance through passive variation in q , f
1
exactly mirrors the behavior of w.

Permanent interest rate increases are

associated with current account surpluses throughout the adjustment process.
A temporary increase in r is followed by a period of surpluses followed by a
period of deficits.
p, the relative price of non-traded goods moves with q.

In all cases

there is an immediate decline in p, permitting resources to be shifted towards
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the production of tradables and private consumption to be shifted away from
tradables to generate the export surplus that permits the accummulation of
foreign assets.
With the permanent unanticipated increase in r, prises steadily
after its initial drop and ultimately achieves a higher value than it had at
E1 •

With the anticipated future increase in r, the price of nontraded goods

continues to decline smoothly after the initial discrete drop until it reaches
its low at t 1 when r actually goes up.
In the case of the transitory increase in r, the initial drop in pis
followed by a gradual increase beyond its initial equilibrium value.

When r

resumes its initial value again, p declines smoothly back to its initial
value.

The high values of p after t

1, when

the solution trajectory crosses

thew= 0 line at E 1111 1.s mirrored in the current account deficit.
12

4.

Real Growth Corrected Balanced Budget Policies
In the remaining sections of the paper we consider continuous real

growth corrected balanced budget policies.

This requires the analysis of the

following model:

(25a)

(25b)

(25c)

(25d)

w = (r-n)w + ~(p, a) -,-q

= (

1-n(p) )q
p

+ (

1-E(p,o) )g
p
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Equations (25d) states that the public sector deficit (per capita) equals nb,
exactly sufficient to keep constant the stock of real per capita debt, b.

In

what follows (25c and d) will be solved for p and one of the four fiscal
parameters (g, ,, 9 and cr) as functions of the remaining three fiscal
parameters and of q, rand b.
(2Sa,b).

Since b

= O,

f

= w.

The

solutions are then substituted into

Even though the public sector balances its

real growth corrected budget, private sector financial dynamics make for non
trivial current account adjustments in response to virtually any kind of
policy or external shock.

4a.

, responds endogenously to maintain budget balance

In this subsection, , adjusts to satisfy the balanced budget
constraint (25d) in response to exogenous variations in g, r, b, 9 or, and to
endogenous variations in p.

The easiest way to proceed is to substitute for

, in (25b) using (25d) and to solve (25c) for pas a function of q, g,
9 and a, which was already done in (18a,f).

The resulting linearized dynamic

system is given in (26), with Pq given in (18b) and (18£).

(26)

.

q

w

r -

o

q-q

=

(y + 9 y' )p -1
n 1-9 T
q

0

0

+
(yN+l~9y~)pg-l

(

w-w

r-n

0

~ ' ) ~ I _p_ ( ~ ')
YN 1-aYT Pa 1-aYT 1-9 YN 1-aYT pcr

The saddlepoint equilibrium condition 1s

q

0

-

g
~
9 - 9
a - a

f

-(r-n)

-b

r - r

b -
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= (r+\)(r-(o+\+n)) + (\+n)(o+\)(y + - 6- y')p < O
N 1-6 T q

The slope of the q = 0 schedule is the same in this case as in
the previous case.

The slope of thew=

0

locus with

T

endogenous,

(r-n)[l-(yN + ~ y~)pq)- 1 , is less, i.e. the schedule is flatter, than with
1 6
gT endogenous, (r-n) [1-yNpq]

-1

•

The long-run equilibrium values of g and w satisfy:

(28a)

[

q=(o+\) w+(n(p(q;g,e,o),6)-(g+ (r-n)b-6yT(l-6)

-1 p(q;g,6,o))))(r+\) -11

(28b)

The important long-run multipliers are given in (2ga too)

(29a)

(29b)

aw
ag

[(\+n)(\+o)(p -p )+(r-n)(r-o)p

(29c)

q

g

g

1~- 1
T

(29d)

(29e)

(29£)

!E.I
ae

T

= P

q

!9.1
ae

T

+p =[-(\+n)(o+\)-60

·

1-0

y' _E_ p +(r+\)(r-(o+\+n))p ]~-l< o
T 1-0

q

0

T
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(29g)

~1

(29h)

awl
acr,

= (o-r)(yN+

(29i)

~1

<
= (r+\)(r-(o+\+n))a -1
T

(29j)

~1

art"

= -[(r-n)q

(29k)

awl
ar,

= -[q(l-(yN+ -1-8

(291)

(29m)

acr

T

acr t"

pq ar,

'

0

+ (\+n)(o+\)f]a- 1
t"

I

y )p )+(r-o)f]aT q
,

-p q [ (r-n)q+(\+n)(oH)f]

1

a-1
t"

( r-n)( r-o) a -1
t"

(29n)

awl
ab ,

=

(290)

~1

= pq

at" ,

-1

( \ +n )( oH )( r-n) a -1 < 0
t"

ab ,

ab,

1~8 Yr') pa a

8

~1- ~1 =
~1 =
art"

0 y~)pcr l a,-1
1-8

= - [ (\+n)(o+\)(yN+

~1

-1
ab, = pq (\+n)(o+\)(r-n) a t" < 0

defined in (27) is negative.
The long-run effects of fiscal policy and exogenous shocks are quite

intuitive.

An increase in exhaustive public spending means with a balanced

budget that total taxes g+(r-n)b increase by the amount of the increase in
public spending.

Private consumption falls as a result.

increases if o > r, falls if o < r.

Financial wealth

If r = o the price level will be boosted

if the share of non-traded goods 1n public spending is higher than that of
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non-traded goods in private spending p

g

> p

q

or 1-€ > 1-n).

This effect will

be reinforced (weakened or offset) if o > r if (o<r).
A balanced budget increase in a and reduction (or increase) in
Twill always lower the relative price of nontraded goods.
(18d), pa+

h

~ O, consumption falls as a increases.

increase if o > r, fall if o < r.

Since, from

Financial wealth will

All this is independent of whether the

increase 1n the tax rate on the production of tradables increases or lowers
the revenues from that tax, as the total tax revenue from both taxes remains
unchanged at g+(r-n)b.
While it is likely that the producer's relative price of non-traded
goods

h

rises as

increases, it 1s again possible that strong income

8

eff~cts reverse this conclusion.

The paradox of an increase in a reducing the

production of non-traded goods and increasing the production of traded goods
by sufficiently immiserizing the private sector remains a logical
possibility.

In the numerator of (29f), both yipqand Pa are increasing in

absolute value, and

¾ilT therefore increases 1n absolute value as the

production possibility frontier becomes less concave and the efficiency loss
from distortionary production taxes increases.

This possibility exists even

when taxes are raised from an initial value of 8 = O.

The reason is that the

long-run equilibrium value of aggregate consumption, q, need not equal the
long-run equilibrium value of domestic product, after taxes, because of the
possibility of holding net foreign assets, i.e.,

q = (1 - a)y

T

+ py

N

or, given a balanced budget,

-

T

+ (r - n) w
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Note, however, that when both 9

=0

and r

=o

in the initial

equilibrium, then this paradoxical movement . _E_ cannot occur.
in 1-9
is that when o

= r,

w

= o,

= o,

awl •
and a0

is only when r > o [i.e. when

::1.

<

o]

The reason

so q will equal yT+pyN-g-(r-n)b.

It

that the paradox occurs.

A switch towards public spending on traded goods for a given total
public spending level reduces the price of non-traded goods.

Note that since,

given 9, this raises the revenue from the tpt, Twill fall to balance the
budget.

The effect on q depends on the sign of yN+

I
_9 yT.
1 9

This is the

effect of an increase in p on~-. when the balanced budget rule is in. effect.
If the concavity of the production possibility frontier is sufficiently low,
real disposable non-interest income could actually increase asp falls because
of an increase in cr.

For lower (absolute) value of y' (and for low values
T

of 9) q will fall as cr rises.
An increase in the world rate of interest will, as in the previous

case where gT balanced the long-run budget, raise long-run q unless the
initial position is characterized by a sufficiently large foreign debt, i.e.,
a large negative value off.

The long-run price of non-traded goods will move

in the same direction as aggregate consumption q.

If r

= o, financial wealth

will increase.
Equations (29m, n, and o) can be used to have a first pass at the
issue of debt repudiation.

Note that a reduction in b increase long-run q and

p and raises (lowers) w depending on- to whether r>o (or r <o).

The long-run

effects, but not the dynamic adjustment, are independent of whether the
repudiation involves domestic or foreign debt.

Figure 5 shows the response of

37

Figure 5:
Debt Repudiation in a Forgiving Environment
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the system, when r =

o,

to an unexpected, immediate (and permanent) debt

repudiation.
In the case where the debt that is repudiated is foreign debt, the
authorities cut taxes(,) by the amount of foreign debt service that 1s no
longer required.

The new long-run equilibrium is at E , and since w 1s not
1

affected by the default, consumption immediately jumps to its new equilibrium
value at E 1 •

If the default is on domestic debt, the initial financial wealth

of domestic residents falls by the amount of debt that is repudiated (db<O).
The initial level of consumption will be on the new saddlepath

s 1s 1

at E , and will always be below the level without default of E •
01
0

~/

After

the default, saving becomes positive and financial wealth augments through
current account surpluses.

The long-run equilibrium is again at E •
1

This account assumed that there was no external response to the
default, through increased interest rates for future external borrowing (which
now includes a default risk premium), through external credit rationing (or
enforced financial autarky) after the default or through other penalties
imposed through trade sanctions or in any other way.

It is the story of the

government that defaults but is believed (with subjective certainty) never to
do so again.
The long-run effects of an increase 1n r on q, wand p with
, endogenous are given in (29 J, k, t).
consequently, w = O.

Consider the case where o =rand,

Comparing (29j, k, t) with the corresponding expressions

when g is endogenous (33j, k, t) we note the following.
that 1-E+p€ = 0 so that p
p

q

=

pq ).

(It is assumed

While q will increase under the gT

endogenous policy, it may decrease under the, endogenous policy, if f 1s
sufficiently negative, i.e., if the government's stock of debt 1s sufficiently
large.

Under the endogenous taxes, higher debt service by the government
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comes straight out of personal disposable income.

Even if f = w = 0 !9. will

' ar

be smaller with, endogenous than with gT endogenous.

The reason is that the

increase in p will, at a given tpt rate e, reduce tpt receipts.
, will increase when it is endogenous.

Consequently

This will limit the increase in q and

thus in p below what happens when gT is endogenous. S/

4b.

9 responds endogenously to maintain budget balance

We now consider the case where e adjusts endogenously to satisfy the
balanced budget constraint (25d) at each instant.

We proceed by solving (25c,

d) for p and 9 as function of q, g, ,, a, rand band substituting these
solutions into (25b).

(30a)

(30b)

9 = e(q;g,,,cr,r,b)

Ola)

p e=
q

(31b)

9
YT'
e
-1
r<e:-1>
pg =
yT(l+ 1-0<1>>- 1-el Me
p

(31c)

YT' -1
e
P, = 1-9 Me

(31d)

e
pa=

(3le)

Yr
-1
e
pr = -b l,;..9 Me < 0

(31£)

y'
e =
T
-1
-(r-n)
(1-e)
Me < 0
Pb

(11-l)
(l+ _e_ 4>) -1 > 0
Me
p YT
1-9

ge:

pa

> 0

-1
YT (l+ 1~94>) Me
I

< 0
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a

(31h)

a
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q

_ 9
I
O-n) -1
- 1-9 YT
p Ma

g

-1
= [-fl-1 + (-a-) YTI o-e:>l Ma > 0
1-9
p

> 0

(3li)

(3lj)

(31k)

-1 -1
Q Ma > 0

= -(r-n)

(311)

ab

(31m)

-Q-1(1+ _a_
Ma =
1-a

<1>)

y

T

y'
- 9(_!_)2 < 0

1-9

I

YT

= y T{p-

- [(1-n+~n' )q +

p

(1-e:+pe:)
E
2
p

g]

(1 + _a_
1-a <I>)]}

To sign these multipliers, I assumed that l +

a

_ <I>> 0 1.e., that an
1 9

increase 1n 9 raises tpt revenue at a given price level.
(but not necessary) for M < O.
9

This 1s sufficient

Interes~ing issues arise when the tpt rate has

been pushed to the inefficient side of the tpt Laffer curve, but they cannot
be addressed here.
The linearized dynamic system 1s given in (32), the condition for
local saddlepoint stability in (33)

(32)

.

g

.
w

=

r-o
y

a
p

N q

-ya -1
T q

-0.+n)(o+;\,)

q - q

r - n

w - w
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0

0

0

e
YNPT -yT6T-l

e
e
yNpcr-yT cr

0

9

+

e
e
:Npg-yT g

e
yNpr-yTer+w

e
yNpb-yTeb

g-~
T-T
cr-cr
r-r
b-b

(33)
or

Qualitatively, the saddlepoint equilibrium in the 6 endogenous case
is similar to those in the gT endogenous and T endogenous cases.
multipliers are given in (34a too).
d) with q

(34a)

(34b)

(34c)

= w = O.

2-9-1
age

awl

age

~,
_ e 2-9-1
age - Pq age

(34d)

(34e)

(34f)

(34g)

aw
dT

+

e

Pg

=

The long run

They are obtained by solving (25a, b, c,
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(34h)

(34i)

!Elaa a- ~1 a
Pqa acr

+ Pa =
cr

< 0

(34j)

(34k)

(341)

(34m)

(34n)

(340)

Note from (31b) that even given q, the effect of an increase 1n g on
pis ambiguous.

This is because while cet.par. an increase in g will raise p

(if some of the additional spending falls in non-traded goods (i.e., e<l)) the
increase 1n

a required to keep the budget balanced (see 31h) will tend to

lower p, both by reducing private demand for non-traded goods and by
increasing their supply.

Clearly, if all the additional spending falls on
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traded goods ( e=l), then pa< O.
g

Even if e=O, on the other hand, an increase

in pis not certain.

If the tax effect dominates, (pa< 0) then the long-run
g

effect of an increase in public spending is to lower q and p, while w
increases if o > r, falls if

o < r.

An increase in,, with budget balance maintained by lowering a, will,
given q, tend to create excess demand for non-traded goods.

a

the market, i.e. p > O.
T

prises to clear

Aggregate consumption in terms of traded goods

therefore increases in the long run and so does the long-run price of nontraded goods.

w will rise if

r>o, fall if r<o.

Switching public spending towards traded goods, holding g constant
will, given q, reduce p.

This will expand the production of trade goods and

the tpt receipts at a given value of a.

The tpt rate is therefore lowered to

prevent a budget surplus from emerging.

For small value of a, long-rung

falls and the price level unambiguously declines in the long run.

For large

values of a, however, the boost to real income associated with lowering the
distortion may be large enough to raise q.
declines.

The long-run value of p of course

w moves in the same direction as q if r > o, in the opposite

direction if

r < o.

An increase in r will, if b > o, require a higher value of a to
balance the budget.
market.

Given q, p falls to equilibrate the non-traded goods

Long-run aggregate consumption in terms of traded goods increases

unless the negative effects on human capital (measured in traded goods) of a
lower value of panda higher value of a, i.e. yNp!-yTar, are very strong.

If

q were to fall, the long-run effect on pis negative, otherwise it is
ambiguous.
A higher value of b also requires a higher tax rate a to take care of
the increased government interest bill.

Given q, the price of nontraded goods
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Long-run q declines, as does long-run p.

> r, decreases if

o

< r.

w increases

To the attractions of repudiation is now added

the lower distortionary tax rates that it permits.

4c.

g responds endogenously to maintain budget balance

When g responds endogenously to ensure budget balance in response to
variations in,, a, cr, r, and b we solve the nontraded goods market
equilibrium condition (25c) and the real growth corrected balanced budget
condition (25d) for p and gas functions of g, ,, a, a, rand b.

(35a)

(35b)

= g(q;,,e,cr,r,b)

g

where
(36a)

pg
q

= 0-n)
p

M

(36b)

pg

= (1-d
p

M

(36c)

pg

(36d)

pg
a

(36e)

(e:-l)bM-1
p
g

(36£)

pg

T

> 0

-1
g

> 0

y'

a=

b

-1

g

=

((1-e:)y + _I__
(1+(1-e:)a]M-l
g
p
T (l-a)2
ge:cr
p

-M

-1
< 0
g

(assuming b ?: 0)

= (e:-l)(r-n)Mg-1

<

o.

This yields
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{36g)

_ 9
, M-1
gq - 1-9 YT
g

(36h)

g-r

= i1 -1
[ -1

-1
M
g

0

=

(36j)

gO'

=-

(36k)

gr

= -n- 1bM-l
g

(361)

gb

= -(r-n)

(36m)

M

= n-1+

g

i1

:$

g

:$
'!

1

y'
-1
9
yT(l+ 1-9 <1>)+0(1~0)2] Mg

g9

{36i)

< 0

9
,
1-9 yTg

i1

E:

pa M-1
g
0

:$

-1 -1
M
g

> 0

(assuming b

~

o)

< 0

_9_ '(s-1) > 0
1-9 YT p

Substituting (3Sa,b) into (2Sa,b) and linearizing around a stationary
equilibrium yields

q
(37)

r-o

.

q-q

r-n

w-w

+
y pg-1
Nq

w

0

y pg-1
N

-(oH)O.+n)

=

L

0

yNp:-yT

0

g
YNPcr

q
y pg+w
Nr

0

g
YNPb

-r--r
9 9
a-a
r-r
b-b

For the system given 1n (37) to have a saddlepoint configuration,
(38) must hold:
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(38)

Assuming as before that thew= 0 locus is upward-sloping, it can be
seen that the slope of thew= 0 locus 1s the same when g is endogenous as
when, is endogenous if 6 = O.

If

O < 6 < 1, then thew= 0 locus is steeper

when g is endogenous than when, 1s endogenous.

21 The

the same slope, regardless of the financing mode.

q = 0 locus always has

The shape of thew= 0

locus with 6 endogenous 10/ cannot in general be ranked relative to that of
thew= 0 locus with g endogenous.
The long-run effects of changes in,, 6, a, rand b on q, wand q are
given below in (39a too).

Note that the special case E=l, no public spending

on (and no changes in public spending on) non-traded goods, gives the
multipliers already obtained in (23a,n) for the gT endogenous case.

(39a)

~,
a.

< 0

g

(39b)

awl
a.
g

(39c)

2..£1
a. g -

(39d)

~1
ae

(39e)

awl

(39f)

2..£1
ae g- Pqg ~,
ae g+pg=
e

(39g)

ae

~,
aa

g

g

g

= (o-r)(y pg - yT)t-gl

Ne
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= (o-r)yN

g -1
P/ig

(39h)

awl
acr g

(39i)

g 2-9.1
i£1
acr g = Pq acr g

(39j)

-[(r-n)q+(A+n)(o+A)(w+y pg)]a-l
2-9.1
ar g =
Nr
g

(39k)

awl
ar g

(391)

i£1
ar g--

(39m)

-(A+n)(o+A)y pg
2-9.1
Nb
ab g =

(39n)

awl
ab g

(390)

g 2-9.1
i£1
ab g = pq ab g

+ pg

= (r+A)(r-(o+A+n))pg

a

(J

A-l < O
g

pg)]a-l
= [-q(l-yNpg)+(o-r)(w+y
q
Nr
g

pg
Pqg 2-9.1
ar g + r

= (o-r)

=

[-pg[(r-n)q+(A+n)(o+X)w]+pg(r+X)(r-(o+X+n))]a-l
q
r
g
A-1 < 0
g

-1
YN pgb Ag

+ pg
b

= pgb

(r+A)(r-(o+X+n))A-l < O
g

The long-run effects of an increase in, with g endogenous, given in
(38a,b,c) are proportional to the long-run effects of an increase in g with
, endogenous, given in (29a,b,c).

2-9.1
ag,

=

2-9.
ag

+

~
!!.
a, ag

.!_!/.

a nd i£1
a. g -- i£1
ag, • ~
a, •

This is because

~1 ~1

Therefore a, g = ag

T

Since, quite obviouslr,

•

~
a ,·

*

2-9.1
a. g -- ~
aT

+

2-9.
ag

•

~
a,

an d

. · 1ar 1y -awl = -awl ~
Simi
'a, g ag, a,
> O, q falls when, is

raised, w falls if r > o (rises if r < o) and p will rise (when
o = r) if e >

n, i.e. if the increase in public spending adds more to public

spending on non-traded goods then the increase in taxes subtracts from private
spending on non-traded goods.
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The ambiguity of the long-run effects of an increase 1n 0 with g
endogenous (equations [39d,e,f]) are the same as those of the long-run effects
of an increase in g with 0 endogenous (equations 34a,b,c) discussed in the
previous Section (note that, since we assume that we aren't on the wrong side
of the tpt Laffer curve,¾¾> 0).
An increase in the share of traded goods in public spending again

lowers long-run p and q, and lowers w if r >

o,

raises it if

o>

r.

Note that

with plower, tpt tax receipts will increase (if 0 > 0) and g will rise to
preserve budget balance.
A higher interest rate requires a lower volume of public spending to
balance the budget.
is ambig.uous.

This will depress p, given q.

The long-run effect 1n q

If it increases, the long:-r:un effect on p is ambiguous.

falls, p must also go down.
public spending.

If q

A larger stock of public debt requires a cut in

p and q fall.

The case where the budget 1s kept balaned by varying the composition
of public spending, keeping the total constant in terms of traded goods 1s
omitted for reasons of space and left as an exercise.
long-run effects of changes in g,

T

and

a,

Much of it (e.g. the

with cr endogenous) can be derived

straightforwardly from the analysis 1n Sections 4a,b, and c (e.g. from the
long-run effects of a change in cr with

5.

T,

0 or g endogenous).

Conclusion
The volume and composition of exhaustive public spending and the

structure of taxation are important influences on the composition of
production between traded and non-traded goods, the real exchange rate, the
net foreign asset position and the volume of private consumption in the short
run and in the long-run.

Even when the problem of public debt stabilization
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1s not present, as 1n section 4 of the paper where the public sector was
assumed to maintain continuous real growth corrected budget balance, important
fiscal options remain.

Two examples serve to illustrate this.

Consider a government that has decided to reduce the bias against
traded goods in its fiscal programme by reducing 9, the tpt rate.

If tax

revenue decreases as 9 is reduced, the government has several options, even
assuming the budget 1s kept balanced.

If it raises the other (lump sum) tax

1n its arsenal, the following will happen.

In the long run (equations

29d,e,f) the consumer's relative price of non-traded goods,p, rises, i.e. the
consumer's real exchange rate depreciates.
non-traded goods~ should decline as

a

The producers' relative price of

is reduced, unless the increase 1n p

more than offsets the reduction 1n the tax rate on traded goods.

This

perverse result can happen only if there are "first-order" real income effects
on private consumption demand from the reduction in the distortionary tax
rate.

Conventional intertemporal optimizing models such as the representative

infinite-lived household, have the property that there are no '!first-order"
real income effect if the distortionary tax is the only distortion and the tax
rate change is evaluated at 9 = O.

In the Yaari-Blanchard model of consumer

behavior, tax rate changes evaluated at 9 = 0 will have "first order" real
income effects even if there are no other conventional distortions, as long as
r, the market interest rate and

a,

preference, differ from each other.

the consumer's pure rate of time
Specifically, if r >

a,

a reduction

in 9 will have a positive first order real income effect, even at 9 = O, which
may boost private spending in general and private demand for non-traded goods
in particular by so much that~ rises when

a is lowered.

In that case the

movement of resources will be out of the traded goods sector and into the non-

- so -
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traded goods sector, in spite of the reduction in the tax rate on tradeables
r * o is operationally equivalent to another distortion.

production.

Without wishing to advance the perverse case as the likely one, it
illustrates the importance of even minor concessions to realism in modelling
private consumption and saving behavior.

The Yaari-Blanchard model with its

effective private discount rate in excess of the marginal cost of government
borrowing, generates equilibria than can be characterized by r below, equal to
or above

o,

in the short run and in the long run.

The absence of debt

neutrality in the Yaari-Blanchard model is another important ingredient in the
analysis of real-world fiscal and financial policy issues.
If instead of raising its other tax, the government accompanies its
cut in

a

by a cut in public spending, the consequences for the real exchange

rate and the sectoral allocation of production can be quite different.
From equations (39d,e,f) it can be seen that the effect on the real
exchange rate is ambiguous.

The cut in

a,

which will cet. par. (i.e. given q

and g) be associated with an increase in p, is accompanied by a spending cut
which, if at least some of it falls on non-traded goods, will tend to depress
their relative price.
now are down.

Unlike the previous case when, was raised, total taxes

Private consumption demand will be boosted and, to the extent

that this falls on non-traded goods, will tend to raise p.

If p declines,

p(l-6)-l declines a-fortiori and production and resources more towards the
traded goods section.

Even if p increases, p(l-6)-l will fall unless the

increase in p 1s very large.
of rover

This is less likely the smaller

a

and the excess

o.
It can be shown that even i f , and g are kept constant, the

government can balance the budge~ when it reduces the tpt rate by shifting the
composition of public spending towards traded goods. 12/ (provided a> 0).
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This will reduce p and restore total tpt tax receipts to their previous level
in spite of the lower rate by reducing~ and further expanding the
production of traded goods.

With this budget balancing strategy, p definitely

declines and resources unambiguously move into the traded goods sector.
The second example concerns alternative balanced budget responses to
an increase in world real interest rates which increses the interest cost of
servicing the public debt.

If the government raises lump-sum taxes to offset

the increased interest bill, the long-run effects will depend on the net
foreign asset position of the country (equations 29, j, k,l).
simplicity the case where r =

o.

Consider for

In that case the country's net foreign aset

position equals -b, the public debt.

For a small negative value off (for a

small public debt)~ the long~rµn response to ~n increase in the interest rate
involves the accumulation of private non-human wealth and an increase 1n the
level of consumption.

The short-run response of consumption to an

unanticipated permanent rise in r of course goes in the opposite direction.
During the adjustment process a low but rising level of consumption generates
the current account surpluses that accumulate into a higher long-run stock of
net foreign assets which permit the long-run increase in consumption.

The

response of pis an immediate sharp drop followed by a steady rise and an
eventual higher long-run equilibrium level.
If the initial position is that of a heavily indebted government and
nation, however, all these results can be reversed, with a long-run decline in
w, q and p being preceded by a short-run consumption boom and current account
deficit.
If the incipient budget deficit resulting from an increase 1n r 1s
avoided by an increase 1n the tpt rate, the result 1s much more ambiguous
(see equations 34j, k, 1). Given q, the increase in

a

required to pay for
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the increase in debt service will tend to reduce p, so p 6 < 0.
r

Two

economies starting off with the same moderate external debt position
((r-n)q+(1+n)(o+1)f>O) could therefore have qualitatively different responses
of p and of the composition of production in the short run and in the long
run, to an increase in r, depending on whether, or 6 is raised
budget.

=3

balance the

Specifically, the short-run decline in p and q followed ~ya long-run

increase in both under the, endogenous rule in response to an u::anticipated
permanent increase in r could become, in the 6 endogenous case, a short-run
increase in q and p followed by a long-run decline.

Of course, ~he increase

in 6 is, unlike the increase in,, associated with a dead-weight loss if
6 >

o.
If public spending is cut to balance the budget following an increase

in r, the effect on p, given q, is again negative, if at least some of the
spending cuts fall on non-traded goods.

For the same (moderate) value of the

foreign debt, the response of q and p can again be in the opposice direction
from what it would be i f , were adjusted to balance the budget.

If the

government's share of non-traded goods in total public consumption 1-e,exceeds
the private sector's share

1-n, a long run decline in pis more likely when g

is endogenous.
All the ingredients necessary for the consideration of alternative
balanced-budget adjustment processes following a variety of internal and
external shocks are contained in the previous sections.

In a subsequent paper

the preliminary unbalanced (but solvent) budget analysis of section (3) will
be extended to allow for more general borrowing strategies.

Finally, the

option of money financing, in practice often the authorities' first resort,
will be added to the policy menu.
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Footnotes

1.

When integrated forward in time, equation (3 1 ) yields equation (3) when we
impose the transversality condition
-f!(r(u)+A))du
lim h(t) e
= O.
!+CD

2.

~

(s, t) is non-interest income, at time t, of a household born at
~ (s, t) is taxes net of transfers for that same household.

times~ t.
3.

Consider, e.g., the simple 2-sector model with one scarce factor, L, which
is subject to diminishing returns in a Cobb-Douglas technology and is
perfectly mobile between sectors, i.e.,

a
YT = (L-LN)

T

-a1

a
Since yT = (L-y N) T = t(yN), we have
N
1

a

a

1

aN
t' = -- T( L-y N)a T-1 YN
aN
N

-2

-1
< 0

1
a -2
T

a -1
aN
+ (-T-)y
]
aN

=
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Therefore,
< 0

and

a -a +
N T

= O,

When yN
a
y

N

=

L

~

= O.

When yN assumes its highest possible value,

-a

N
'

_
T
- 1-a

~

T

Therefore, with aT > .5,

•

~

can exceed 1 in absolute

·value and a Laffer curve for the tpt exists.
4.

It is comforting that governments cannot put the economy on a Pareto
superior aggregate consumption path through a default on internally held
debt.

[Note that the traded goods only economy is the special case of our

economy when pq = O.

In such an economy a path of q that dominates

another path must be Pareto-superio r].
It is easily checked [see Suiter (1984)] that the slope of the
saddlepaths in Figure 5 is
(r-n) +
~,

dw SS

=

✓ (r-n) 2 + 4(o+\) (A+n) (1-p (yN+ ~ Yi>>
a
2
[l - pq(yN + 1-8 y~)]

x, the horizontal distance at E to the new saddlepath
0

s 1s 1

through E1 ts

given by

2(r-n) (1-p (yN +

X

~

y~))

8
= db - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ~ - 1
- - - - - - - - - - - < db
(r-n) +
2
a
✓

(r-n)

+ 4(o+A)(A+n)(l-p q(yN +

_ yi))
1 8
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Therefore a default of magnitude db will put the economy on a point such
as E01 on

5.

s 1s 1

at a value of q below that at E0 •

What can one say of the "balanced budget multiplier" in this model, i.e.
the effect of a tax-financed increase in public spending on real domestic
output?

Real domestic product (in terms of traded goods) at factor cost

is (1-e)yT + pyN. Since (1-e)yi + py~ = 0 by profit maximization, the
effect of an increase in g on domestic value added is simply given by
YN !£1
ag T

From (29d) if r = cS, this will be positive if 1 - e: > 1

0

negative if 1 - e: < 1 -

n.

- n,

In terms of non-traded goods, value added at

factor cost changes by

- y

(1-e)
T

p

2

!£1
ag ,·

The effect on domestic income at market prices (in terms of traded goods)
is given by

the effect on domestic income at market prices (i.t.o non-traded goods) is
given by

a (
ag

I

YT
P

8

1-e

YT)!£

.
. d ex
I n terms o f t he consumer price
in

p

ag

T

.
h
p = p l-n wh.ic h.is appropriate
wen

preferences are Cobb-Douglas, the change in real domestic income
given by

y is
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aag y~1 T
If o =rand b=g=O, then q = yT+pyN and the expression reduces to:

a y~1 T
ag

=

n-1

8

This disappears if 9 = O.
when 9 = O.

lEI

I

1-9 YT

p

ag

T

However, if o * r, real income will change even

In that case, again with gT = gN = b = O, and therefore w =

f,

~

~

ag

T

= pn-2 [(r-n)w +

Since w > 0 when r >

6.

Algebraically,

16 T I

>

o,

9

']

1-8 PYT

lE
ag

T

this expression will be positive even if 9=0.

16 gT I

8.

9.

From (37), when g 1s endogenous, *lw=O

=

r-n
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From (26), when, is endogenous,

0-n)
pn

-1

e ) y' (l-n)]-1

- ( 1-e

T

pn

-1

10. From (32), when G is endogenous,

~1 w=O
dw

11.

¾; is

the long-run effect on q of an increase in,, holding g constant.

~ is the long-run effect on q of an increase in g, holding, constant.
ag

*

is the change in g required, in the long run, to balance the budget

when, is increased and similarly for

a,
ag•

12. Given q, the change in cr that balances the budget when e is increased is
y'
ge
given by: cre = [n-lyT(l + l~e ~) + e(1:a>2] [<1~e)y~ Pcr]-1 < O
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APPENDIX

The Yaari-Blanc hard Model of Consumer Behavior

The only new element in this Appendix is in the subsection on
aggregation where population growth is allowed for.

The individual' s problem
Each individual born at times maximizes the following utility
functional at t ~s.

(1)

; o>O

o is the instantaneo us pure rate of time preference.

_{1

(2)

-

-µ -µ
z

ln z

(µ=O)

1-µ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Et is the mathematica l expectation operator, conditional on the
information available at time t.
During his or her lifetime each consumer faces a common,
instantaneo us probability of death X~O.

The probability , at time t, of

. .
.
. t here f ore given
.
bye -X(v-t) •
surviving
unti·1 time
v~t is
Equation (1) can therefore be rewritten as

(l ')

max Im e -(o+l)(v-t) -1 -z(s,v) µ dv
t

µ

SUD/wb-a/8- 20-86

- 2 -

We define the following.

Pt is the domestic currency price of traded

goods, Pn the domestic currency price of non-traded goods, m the nominal money
stock, xT consumption of traded goods,
i the nominal interest rate.

(3c)

iN

consumption of non-traded goods and

In addition:

q(s,v) _ c(s,v) + i(v)~(s,v)/p T(v).

The instantaneo us utility function z is further characteriz ed in
equations (4a, b).

The instantaneo us utility function z is weakly separable between money and
goods.
$

and m.

fc is linear homogeneous in
xT and xN.

fq is is linear homogeneous in

It is also homogeneous of degree zero in PT,
PN and m.

fc is

increasing in xT and xN, strictly quasi-conca ve, three lines continuousl y
differentia ble and satisfies Inada-type condition that ensure strictly
positive solutions for xT and xN, for positive
$

c.

fq is increasing in

and m, decreasing in pT and pN form> O, strictly quasi-conca ve, three

times continuousl y differentia ble and satisfies Inada-type conditions ensuring
positive solutions for~ and non-negativ e solutions form, for positive

g.
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Thus, preferences over consumption of traded goods xT' nontraded
goods xN and real money balances are homothetic.

In addition there is a

subutility function fc generated by homothetic preferences over xT and xN.

Homogeneity of degree zero of fq 1n pT' pN and m implies that z can
be written as:

(4a')

Z

= fq(ljl, 1 '

m)

ir, -

PT

Homogeneity of degree 1 of fq in

1jl

and m implies that (4a') can be

rewritten as:

(4a")

Homogeneity of degree one of fc 1n

xT and xN

implies that (4a") can

be rewritten as:

(4a "')

The instantaneous flow budget identity of the consumer is given 1n
(5).

There are 5 financial assets among which the consumer allocates his

financial wealth: non-interest bearing domestic money,
short bonds denominated in domestic currency,
denominated in foreign currency, b

*,

b,

m,

interest-bearing

interest-bearing short bonds

interest-bearing short bonds whose value

is index-linked to the price of traded goods,}, and claims to real
reproducible capital k.

The instantaneous domestic nominal interest rate 1s

i; the instantaneous domestic real interest rate (in terms of traded goods) is

SUD/wb-a/8-20-8 6
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r, the instantaneous foreign nominal interest rate 1s i * and the domestic
currency price of a unit of installed capital 1s pk.

Eis the spot foreign

exchange rate, n the nominal value of divided payments per unit of
capital,; nominal wage income, and~ tax payments net of transfers.

-* (s,t)+n(t)k(s,t
+r* (t)pT(t)j(s,t)+
i * (t)e(t)b
)+w(s,t)-,(s,t)

Equation (5) 1s the identity that saving equals disposable income
minus consumption.
The first term on the r.h.s of (5) reflects the operation of
efficient life insurance or annuities markets.

Each private consumer enters

into the following contract with an insurance company.

As long as he lives

the consumer receives a rate of return p on his total financial asset holdings
at each instant.

When he dies, the portfolio becomes the property of the

insurance company (conversely, if the consumer's net financial asset position
is negative, he pays a rate of return
the debt being cancelled when he dies).
with free entry.

p to the company on his net debt, with
The insurance industry is competitive

There is a large population and

\ is not only the

instantaneous probability of death for an individual but also the fraction of
each vintage and therefore of the total population that dies at each
instant.

It is obvious that the competititve (zero expected profit) rate of

- s-
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return paid by or to insurance companies is
fraction

p

= A.

(Not

A of the entire populatio n owning a fraction

assets dies each period.

p

=n

+ A; a

A of all nonhuman

This is all that can be paid out by the insurance

companies to the surviving agents).
Let real financial wealth in terms of traded goods be denoted a,

(6}

-* + p
m + b + pTj +Eb

k

k

a=-- --------- PT
We assume that all financial assets other than money earn the same

expected rate of return i.e •

(7)

r

=i

PT

-- = i *
PT

.
+

E

PT

E

PT

pk
PT
+--pk
PK
PT

=21_

(6) and (7) permit us to rewrite (S) as

(8)

d

-

dt a(s,t)

Integratin g (8) forward in time we obtain the household 's present
value budget constrain t, intertemp oral budget constrain t or solvency
constrain t:
V

(9)

fe-f(r(u)+ A)du q(s,v)dv _ a(s,t)+h( s,t)
t

where

Oo>

h(s,t)
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h 1s the consum er's human capita l, the presen t discoun ted value (using the
private discoun t rate r+A) of expecte d future after-t ax labour income .
In order to obtain (9) we imposed the no-Pon zi game transv ersalit y
conditi on:

(11)

lim e-J~(r( u)+A)d ua(s,t) = O
t+m

From the first-o rder conditi ons for an interio r optimum we obtain the
followi ng consum ption functio ns:

(12a)

= (1-nT( n(t))~( s,t)

(12b)

(13a)

T T'
1-n +nn >O

n(t)

c(s,t) = nC (i(t))q
(s,t)

1

(13b)

(14a)

1-n C +in C >O

q(s,t) = 0Ct>(a Cs,t)+h Cs,t))

a,

0(t)
(14b)

1

_JJ_

Yr(u)d u+(v-t )(A~lo)] ( )1-µ
µ- 1 c
-µ
y v
J e -[-L
.
t

~

-1
1.
'f

if µ=O

(14c)

21

µ;: 0-
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Aggregati on
At each instant a new age cohort composed of many agent is born.
.
. ( n+X ) e nt , n, X~.
size of t he cohort born at time
tis
0

The

The constant

instantane ous probabili ty of death of an agent, X, is also taken to be the
proportio n of agents in each cohort which die at each instant.

The size of

the surviving cohort at time t which was born at time s~t is therefore
(n+X)ens e-X(t-s).

Total populatio n at any instant tis given by

e

nt

-co

For any individua l agent's stock or flow ;(s,t) we define the
correspon ding aggregate V(t) to be

-co

We assume that each agent, regardles s of age, earns the same wage income and
pays the same taxes net of transfers , i.e.,

~(s,t) = ~(t) for alls~ t

It follows that each surviving agent has the same human capital:

h(s,t) = h(t) for alls~ t.
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Aggrega te consump tion 1s, by direct computa tion, given by

(16a)

Q(t) = 0(t)(A( t) + H(t))

(16b)

A(t) = r(t) A(t) + W(t) - T(t) - Q(t)

(16c)

H(t) = (r(t)+X+ n))H(t)+ T(t)-W( t) ~/

3/

0(t) is as defined in (14b, c).
For any aggrega te V, the correspo nding per-cap ita magnitud e is
defined by

(17)

v(t) _ V(t)e-n t

Per capita consump tion 1s therefor e given by:

(18a)

q(t) = 0(t) (a(t) + h(t))

0(t) 1s as defined 1n (14b,c).

(18b)

a.Ct>

(18c)

h(t)

(18d)

c(t)

(18e)

= (r(t)-n) a(t) + w(t) - ,(t) - q(t)

= (1-n~(i (t))) (t)

1(t)

q
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(18f)

T

(18g)

( ) = (1-n (n{t)))c( t)

xN t

n(t)

From (18a,b,c) an alternati ve represent ation of the behavior of q is:

(18h)

q(t) = (r(t)-o)q( t)-(X+n)( o+X)a(t)
or

(18i)

q(t) = (r(t)-(o+ n))q(t) - X(o+X)a( t)+n(o+X) h(t).

If labor-aug menting (Harrod-n eutral) technical change at a constant
proportio nal rateµ is allowed for, the behavior of private consumpti on 1s
shown in 19.

For any per capita variable v, v denotes the correspon ding

magnitude per unit of efficienc y labor.

(19a)

q = 0(a+h)
0 is as defined in (14b,c)

(19b)

a= (r-(n+µ))a +w+,-q

(19c)

h = (r+X-µ)h+ ,-w

(19d)

C

(19e)

C

= n q
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(19£)

(19g)
1f

Using (19a,b,c), the consumption function can be written as:

(19a I)

q = (r-(o+µ+X))q - (o+X)na + (o+X)Xh

or

(19a")

-

q = (r-(o+µ))q - (o+X)(X+n)a.

In Suiter [1986b] it is shown that X=n=0 is necessary for debt
neutrality, but that µ=0 is not necessary.

The result that population growth

alone can destroy debt neutrality is due to Weil [1985].
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Footnotes

1.

To obtain (13a,b), I assumed that the following first-order condition

iii/ Pr

could be solved for - - as a function of i only:
C

fq

T

This will be the case if £2 -£2(fi)- 1f1 -(f4 -f4(~c + f~ 1 ))f~(l-~) = O.
3
3
1
1

2

Unless this 1s satisfied, nC will be a function of both 1 and n.

2.

If randy are constants, then

3.

We use the fact that a(t,t) = O.

4.

We use the fact that -h(t,t)e nt

~

-~(t)e nt = H(t) •

Note also that W(t) = ~(t)ent and T(t} = ~(t)ent •

